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Muddying the waters: Who Induces Volatility in an Emerging Market? 
 
 
Do all investor types contribute equally to volatility formation?  Although stock volatility 
should ideally originate only from fundamental innovations, it is embedded into prices through 
the trading process. We compare the relative contributions of trading by local institutions, local 
individuals and foreign institutions to the volatility of individual stocks, using a proprietary 
dataset and a battery of robust measures. Overall, neither local nor foreign institutions are the 
major drivers of volatility, not even during times of financial stress. Individuals consistently 
appear to induce more of the volatility and liquidity, behaving as the archetypical noise traders 
but also as liquidity providers.  
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1. Introduction 
Volatility is a primary concern for both investors and regulators in financial markets. Excessive 
volatility distorts economic decisions, impairs the credibility of prices as economic signals and 
reduces real investment by increasing the cost of capital1. In turn, regulators use volatility as an 
indicator of market quality. Volatility peaks may affect the proper functioning of markets, leading 
to a loss in investor confidence2. To understand how volatility is generated, theoretical models that 
predict a positive contemporaneous relation between trading activity and volatility are a starting 
point. First, from a market microstructure point of view, the arrival of new information encourages 
both trading and price variability (Easley and O´Hara, 1987; Barclay and Warner, 1993). Second, 
both informed and uninformed investors prefer to trade when the trading activity is high, inducing 
volatility increases (Kyle, 1985; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). It is also important to distinguish 
between two types of volatility (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1989; Bandi and 
Russell, 2006; Harris, 2003). Fundamental volatility comes from the change in economic 
determinants of the stock value. In contrast, transitory volatility derives from the trading process 
itself and the liquidity demands of traders. This volatility is of particular interest for the exchanges 
and regulators since it depends on the market design. Nevertheless, we lack a deeper understanding 
of how trading activity drives volatility in spite of the well-known positive relation between the 
two (Karpoff, 1987; Schwert, 1989; Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz, 2005). In this context, this study 
explores how the trading by different types of investors contributes to volatility in an emerging 
market. 
                                                      
1 See, for example, David (1997); Galeotti and Schiantarelli, (1994); Kupiec (1991); Shiller (2003). 
2 This point has been argued by Ozenbas, Schwartz, and Wood (2002); Pagano and Schwartz (2003); and Poon and 
Granger (2003). 
This is an interesting subject to study for several reasons. First, the reported heterogeneities 
between investor groups suggest that different groups have dissimilar roles in the trading process 
and perhaps distinct effects on volatility3. Moreover, the differential effects on volatility reported 
in previous studies are somewhat ambiguous and not necessarily comparable4. Second, we 
contribute to a better understanding of the trade-offs emergent in financial markets, with clear 
implications for stock exchanges, market regulators, and sell-side institutions. A case in point is 
the evidence that local individuals are the main liquidity providers in some emerging markets but 
that they lag behind other groups in terms of performance5. In addition, despite its contribution to 
liquidity, noise trading can also impose a welfare cost on the economy by reducing the capital 
stock and consumption (De Long et al, 1989). A third example is the discussion of the pros and 
cons of allowing foreign investors to trade freely in emerging markets6.  
In this study, we compare the relative effect of trading by local institutions, local individuals 
and foreigners (all institutions) on the volatility in the Colombian stock exchange, Bolsa de Valores 
de Colombia (henceforth BVC), by taking advantage of two unique databases. First, from the 
                                                      
3 Previous studies have reported that different investors groups have different degrees of information (Coval and 
Moskowitz, 1999; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; Huang and Shiu, 2009), investment styles (Barber, Lee, Liu, and 
Odean, 2008; Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1995; Kaniel, Saar, and Titman, 2008), and behavioral biases 
(Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007). 
4 For example, whereas Holmes and Wong (2001) and Hamao and Mei (2001) find a stabilizing effect of foreign 
trading in four Asian stock markets, the results of and Wang (2007) portray them as volatility drivers in Japan and 
Indonesia and Thailand, respectively. There is also ambiguity with respect to the effect of individual investors. Kaniel, 
Saar, and Titman (2008) argue that individual investors can be characterized as the archetypical “noise trader” (De 
Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1990; Kyle, 1985) but find no significant volatility increase after intense 
individual trading in NYSE. The following two studies in the Chinese stock markets, based on ownership rather than 
trading data also render ambiguous results. Ng and Wu (2007) report that the net buying of stocks by wealthy 
individual investors in China helps to reduce stock market volatility.  Chen, Du, Li, and Ouyang (2013) find that 
foreign institution´s ownership increases (reduces) volatility but foreign individual´s reduce it.  They also find positive 
relationships between all type of local ownership ( institutions, individuals and government) on stock volatility.  
5 In particular, Lee, Lin, and Liu (1999) and AUTHOR (2018b) in Taiwan and Colombia, respectively, identify 
individual investors as liquidity providers through passive orders and responsible for a larger share of the trading 
volume, with their performance lagging behind that of foreigners and local institutions. 
6 In this respect, Montiel and Reinhart (1999) and Chinn and Ito (2006) discuss the role of capital controls and foreign 
flows in Latin American and Asian emerging countries, respectively. Moreover, capital controls is a disputed point, 
backed by the results of studies such as Wang (2007) but not by those of  Bekaert and Harvey (2003) and Lin, Lee, 
and Chiu (2009). 
BVC, we use a proprietary database of nine years that includes the number of trades, volume and 
value traded for both buys and sells of each of the three groups at the stock-day level. These data 
overcome the limitations of previous studies to properly identify the investor groups7. Second, we 
estimate intraday volatility and liquidity measures using a hand-collected two-year sample of trade 
and quote from Bloomberg and merge it with the previous database8. Using different panel data 
specifications and alternative measures, we test for the relation between the trading activity of each 
group and the volatility at the stock level. Thus, we are able to identify the type of investor inducing 
more volatility.  
The contribution of this study to the literature is threefold. First, we compare the effect of the 
three types of investors in the same study, namely, foreigners, locals, and individuals on volatility, 
and not just two types as in previous studies. This is particularly important since foreigners are 
mostly institutions in emerging markets, whereas the local group includes both institutional and 
individual investors9. Lumping together the two local groups might obscure their effects on 
volatility. In our sample for Colombia, individuals represent 36% of traded value, local institutions 
represent 56%, and the remaining 12% belongs to foreigners, all of them institutions10. Second, 
we measure the fundamental and transitory components of intraday volatility separately and 
                                                      
7 This database allows us to overcome the limitations of previous studies on trading by different groups and volatility. 
Hamao and Mei (2001) use data on buys and sells for different types of investors in Japan but only at monthly 
frequency, and their foreign group contains both institutions and individuals. Wang (2007) acknowledges that his data 
on the Jakarta stock exchange do not discriminate between the two groups of local investors and that the data from 
the Thai Stock Exchange lack the number of operations.  
8 Since Bloomberg only stores 6 months of trade and quote data, data from this database were collected for only a two-
year period.   
9 From the BVC and two large brokerage houses, we confirm that the foreign group in Colombia is composed 
exclusively of institutions and no retail traders, including mostly international asset managers and mutual funds, with 
a minor share for hedge funds and direct investment. 
10 Moreover, individuals represent a larger share of the total trading in emerging markets than in developed markets. 
For instance, in the Chinese market, domestic individuals are responsible for up to 94% of trading value (Ng and Wu, 
2007); likewise, they represent 90% in Taiwan (Barber et al., 2009) and approximately 60-75% in Korea (Choe, Kho, 
and Stulz, 2005). In contrast, Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2008) report for the US that only approximately 4% of the 
trading activity corresponds to individual investors. 
estimate the differential effects of the three groups on both measures. This allows us to determine 
the effects on volatility coming from market microstructural effects, such as the bid-ask bounce 
and the quote depth11.  
A final contribution comes from the data itself. The Colombian stock market is an ideal market 
to study the effects of trading in volatility, at least for three reasons. First, these effects are arguably 
larger in small, less mature emerging markets like Colombia, and more critical to their 
development. This country is representative of emerging or frontier markets in early stages of 
development, unlike Korea and Taiwan that hold larger and more sophisticated markets, where the 
effects of different investor groups on the stability of markets have been studied the most (e.g 
Choe, Ko and Stulz, 2005; Choi and Choi, 2008) 12. In addition, the data on the local institutional 
group available in Colombia is further identified as brokerage houses, pension funds, mutual funds, 
insurance companies, family offices and financial intermediaries, so we can examine the 
differential effects of different subgroups of these institutions. Finally, to our knowledge, this is 
the first study of its type conducted in a Latin American market. Since most of the previous studies 
use data from Asian stock markets, the Colombian stock market provides an out-of-sample test of 
their results. 
The main findings can be summarized as follows. First, trading by local individual investors is 
the major driver of volatility, with a somewhat larger effect for sells than for buys. In turn, trades 
by local and foreign institutions have a lower impact on volatility, consequent with a stabilizing 
                                                      
11 The importance of controlling for liquidity effects is illustrated by Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001). They assert 
that larger bid-ask spreads may have contrary effects on volatility: first, a mitigating effect by discouraging trading 
activity and second, an increasing effect due to a larger bid-ask bounce. Moreover, the same authors argue that a low 
quote depth also induces more volatility by increasing the frequency of trades outside the quotes. 
12 To illustrate this point note that both Korea and Taiwan are among the five largest emerging markets by market 
capitalization (WFE 2016). By the same criteria, Colombia is in the lower quartile. Furthermore, FTSE (2017)  
classifies Korea and Taiwan as developed and advanced emerging markets, respectively, while Colombia is grouped 
among the secondary emerging markets. 
role of institutions in the market13. These results are robust for different subsamples of the data, 
alternative specifications, and various measures of intraday volatility. Moreover, contrary to what 
is suggested by the foreign flows literature, the effect of foreign trading on volatility is significantly 
lower than the effect of both local groups, even in times of worldwide financial stress. In addition, 
we find that the trading by short-term local institutions (e.g., brokerage houses) has a larger effect 
on volatility than that of long-term firms (e.g., funds).  
Moreover, the results on intraday measures confirm that individual investors, as a group, have 
the largest impact on fundamental volatility but at the same time the largest contribution to 
liquidity. This is consistent with a dual role: while some of these investors provide liquidity using 
passive orders, others behave as active speculators, inducing volatility. This dual role of 
individuals has precedents in the literature. For example, Barber and Odean (2001) conjecture that 
a group of day traders contributes to liquidity trough passive orders, whereas another group might 
be creating volatility with an aggressive trading style. Additionally, Foucault, Sraer, and Thesmar 
(2011) report that retail trading increases volatility in the Paris Bourse14. We obtain confirmatory 
evidence by comparing the cost of execution and daily performance of the three types. We find 
that although individuals have a relatively low average cost of execution, they present the worst 
average daily performance of the three groups; thus, this group is not dominated by informed 
traders. This is consistent, with retail investors behaving, as a group, as the archetypal noise trader 
                                                      
13 Arguably, “smart-money” investors should stabilize prices by arbitraging away mispricing (Black, 1986; De Long 
et al., 1990). This stabilizing role has been reported for pension funds in the US by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1992) and for institutions in China (Ng and Wu, 2007). However, the evidence here goes against the theoretical model 
of Gabaix, Gopikrishnan, Plerou, and Stanlety (2006) that implies that large institutions’ trading in low liquidity 
markets should induce volatility.  
14 Furthermore, the liquidity providing role of individual investors has also been reported in Taiwan by  Lee, Lin, and 
Liu (1999), in France by Barrot, Kaniel and Sraer (2016) and in Australia by Tian, Do, Doung and Kaley (2015).  
Evidence of their aggressive trading around news has been reported in Taiwan by Tsai (2004), in the US by Barber 
and Odean (2007) and Kaniel, Liu, Saar and Titman (2012) and in Australia by Tian, Do, Doung and Kaley (2015). 
Finally, Lee et al (1999) report that in Taiwan, large retail traders behave as informed investors, whereas small ones 
are liquidity providers.   
in the sense of Black (1986), Kyle (1985) and De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman 
(1989,1990).  
To our knowledge, the study most related to ours is Wang´s (2007) who test for the effects of 
daily foreign flows in the volatility of Indonesian and Thai stock markets. He finds that foreign 
sells increase market volatility, and fails to find any effect from local trades. Our study 
differentiates in at least two aspects: First, we separate the effect of the two main local groups: 
institutional and locals. As demonstrated by previous studies in emerging markets the local group 
is far from homogeneous. Local institutions tend to be more sophisticated investors than retail 
traders, with larger trades, superior trading execution, and better performance in different time 
horizons (Barber et al, 2008 in Taiwan; Agudelo, Byder, Yepes-Henao, 2019 in Colombia). 
Second, by using a trade and quote database for Colombian stocks, we are able to account for the 
market microstructural effects underlying volatility increases, such as the bid-ask bounce (Roll, 
1984), and the quote depth. As argued by Kavajecz & Odders-White (2001), market microstructure 
effects are critical for volatility formation (see footnote 11).  
All in all, our results highlight the importance of the interaction between different groups of 
traders in a stock exchange in the processes of price formation and liquidity providing, with 
volatility as a side effect. For an emerging market, we identify the central role of individual 
investors as the main liquidity providers but also as the ones “muddying the waters” with their 
aggressive trades. In contrast, local institutions clearly behave as more sophisticated investors, 
taking advantage of the liquidity provision, inducing relatively less volatility, and obtaining a 
better overall performance.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: section 2 outlines the hypotheses; section 
3 describes the databases; section 4 explains the methodology; section 5 presents and discusses the 
results, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
The direct relation between trading and volatility is the natural starting point to formulate the 
hypotheses of this study. This has been extensively studied, as summarized by the survey paper of 
Karpoff (1987). He explains that the positive relation between trading and volatility comes from 
“the rate of information flow to the market, how the information is disseminated, the extent to 
which market prices convey the information, the size of the market, and the existence of short sales 
constraints” (Karpoff, 1987, p.109). Besides, Kaul and Lipson (1994) find that for NASDAQ 
stocks, the number of trades is the relevant measure of the market activity effect on volatility, 
rather than the size of trades, which does not convey information. However, Chan and Fong (2000), 
with a sample that also includes NYSE stocks, report that the size of trades does have a role in 
explaining higher volatility.    
In turn, theoretical models in market microstructure predict a positive contemporaneous relation 
between trading activity and volatility. First, the arrival of new information encourages both 
speculative trades and price variability, as in the model of Easley and O’Hara (1987). Second, both 
informed and liquidity investors prefer to trade when the trading activity is high (Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1988), which explains coincident clusters of volume and volatility. In turn, some 
evidence shows that trading activity generates volatility by itself aside from fundamentals. For 
example, French and Roll (1986) show that volatility is higher whenever exchanges are open.  
 
In this context, we are interested in contrasting the effects of trading by different groups of 
investors on stock market volatility. Based on the theoretical models and the extant empirical 
evidence, we formulate the following three hypotheses:  
 
H1. Trading by individuals increases the volatility at the stock level  
As a group, individual traders are considered the quintessential noise trader (Kaniel et al. 2008). 
Since noise traders trade randomly, their increasing trading should induce volatility (De Long et 
al, 1989). Evidence in support of the informational disadvantage of retail investors has been 
presented in Colombia by Agudelo et al (2019) and in Taiwan by Lee, Liu, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2004) and Barber et al (2008)15. Day trading can be seen as an extreme example 
of uninformed trading by individuals, attributed to overconfidence (Barber and Odean, 2004). In 
turn, Venezia, Nashikkar and Shapira (2011), using trading data of Israeli stocks, report that 
herding among amateurs Granger-cause volatility. In a related point, Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, 
and Xu (2001) conjecture that day trading by small investors explains higher idiosyncratic 
volatility for US stocks over time. In the same vein, Kyröläinen (2008) reports evidence that day-
trading by individuals is associated with intraday volatility in the Finnish stock exchange16. 
Finally, Choi and Choi (2008) find evidence consistent with individuals generating systematic 
noise in Korea.  
In turn, individual traders have also been identified as important liquidity providers in the US 
(Kaniel et al, 2008; Barber and Odean, 2001), France (Barrot et al, 2016), Australia (Tian et al., 
                                                      
15 This does not rule out the possibility that a group of individuals can be successful short-term speculators, for 
example, around corporate news, as documented by Kaniel et al. (2012) for the US, and Tsai (2014) for Taiwan.  
16 On the contrary, Ng and Wu (2007) report that net buys by wealthy individual investors contribute to reducing 
stock volatility in China, and Wang (2007) fails to find any relation between individual trading activity and volatility 
for the Thai stock market.  
2015), Taiwan (Lee et al., 1999; Lee et al, 2004) and Colombia (Agudelo et al, 2019). This liquidity 
provision might modify the volatility effect of individual noise trading. This serves as an additional 
justification for controlling for liquidity effects when testing the effects of individuals on volatility 
and vice versa. 
 
H2. Trading by institutional investors induces less volatility than does trading by individuals.  
In the theoretical models of Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985), informed investors 
drive prices close to their fundamental values, taking advantage of the mispricing created by noise 
traders Therefore, informed traders can be expected to mitigate transitory volatility. Previous 
studies have found that the performance of institutional investors is superior to that of retail 
investors in Taiwan (Lee et al 2004) and Colombia (Agudelo et al, 2019), and both studies link 
this performance to superior information. Therefore, we expect that institutional trading has a 
lower effect on volatility than individuals’ trading.  
Little evidence has been presented on the contribution of institutional investors to stock 
volatility. Kyröläinen (2008) and Hamao and Mei (2001) fail to find any relation between 
institutional investors and stock volatility in Finland and Japan, respectively. Only  Ng and Wu 
(2007) find that net institutional sells have a mitigating effect in the Chinese stock market. One 
reason for this might be the difficulty in distinguishing among the trades by different types of 
institutions. Different firms should have different styles of trading and diverse degrees of 
information. As two opposite examples, we might find a value investor with a long-term 
orientation, and a short-term institutional speculator, whose behavior might be closer to that of an 
individual day trader. Our data allow us to mitigate this limitation. In the last set of results, we 
classify local institutions into two subgroups: short-term (e.g., brokerage houses) and long-term 
investors (e.g., pension funds). We expect a lower effect on volatility by the trading activity of the 
latter, since they should be more patient investors, use more passive orders, and be better suited to 
trade on mispricing opportunities. In contrast, we expect that short-term institutions are more 
aggressive and speculative in their trades and therefore have a larger effect on volatility. 
 
H3. Trading by foreigners induces less volatility than trading by individuals. 
The expected effect of foreign investors on volatility is less clear than of the other two groups. 
There are arguments and evidence to support contrary expectations, as explained below. Given 
these two opposite expectations on the effect of foreigners on volatility, we let the data to speak 
for itself. 
On the one hand, there is evidence that foreign flows, especially when selling in rush, can create 
excess volatility in a set of 45 emerging markets at market level (Bae, Chan and Ng, 2004). Wang 
(2007) reports that foreign selling increases the volatility of the Indonesian and Thai equity 
markets. He argues that foreigners’ effect on volatility is made worse by the leverage effect and 
the reduction of the investor base. This volatility generation might also be related to the evidence 
that sudden portfolio rebalances of foreign investors, prompted by negative international factors, 
can lead to large capital outflows and drops in emerging market returns (Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz 
2004;  Richards, 2005). In this respect, we also examine the effects of foreign flows on volatility 
in days of worldwide financial stress (peaks in the VIX indicator), when presumably those 
consequences should be larger. Moreover, due to the link between lower liquidity and higher 
volatility, discussed above, a more liquidity-demanding trading style can also play a role. In this 
sense, studies in emerging markets such as Korea (Choe et al. 2005), Taiwan (Lee et al.2004) and 
Colombia (Agudelo et al, 2019) report that foreign investors are more aggressive investors, 
demand liquidity through active orders, and trade with larger execution costs.   
On the other hand, we find at least two arguments against foreigners inducing volatility. First, 
foreign investors in Colombia, as in many other emerging markets, are almost exclusively 
institutions17. Thus, the argument presented in H2 above can also apply to them, and foreign 
trading might have a lower effect on volatility than trading by individuals. Along these lines, 
Holmes and Wong (2001) report that the liberalization processes reduced the asymmetric response 
of volatility in Southeast Asian stock markets and increased the flow of informed traders. 
Moreover, Lin, Lee, and Chiu (2009) find a stabilizing effect of foreigners in a post-liberalization 
era in Taiwan, after the government lifted restrictions on foreign ownership. Second, when not 
differentiating between local groups of investors as in Wang (2007) for Indonesia, foreign net 
flows might be just proxying for undetected net selling coming from a specific group of local 
investors (e.g. retail traders), that might be the main driver of volatility. Thus, the finding of the 
previous literature of a positive relationship between foreign sales and volatility in some emerging 
markets is not necessarily conclusive.  
 
3. Data 
We use two main datasets. First, we use a proprietary database from the Colombia Stock Exchange 
(BVC) from January 1, 2007 to January 29, 2016 on trading activity by type of investor. This 
database includes the following three measures of activity on a stock-day basis by investor group:  
number of trades, traded value (in local currency units) and traded volume (number of stocks), for 
                                                      
17 Foreign investors in the Colombian stock market are exclusively institutions, with no individuals, and mostly 
include international asset managers and mutual funds as well as a few hedge funds and some foreign direct 
investment. This is anecdotally confirmed by the BVC and one of the main Colombian Brokerage houses. 
both buys and sells. As in similar studies in emerging markets (Lee et al, 2004; Choe et al, 2005; 
Barber et al, 2008), this database identifies three main groups of investors: local individuals, 
foreigners, and local institutions. In the latter group, a further classification is provided in 
brokerage firms, pension funds, family offices, mutual funds, trusts, corporations, and banks and 
other financial institutions. To identify the parties involved in each trade, the BVC uses a unique 
tax identification number (NIT). However, for privacy reasons, the database reports daily 
information summarized by investor group; hence, we cannot identify or track the trades of any 
particular investor.  
To clean up this database, we validate that the stocks bought and sold in each day are consistent 
according to the three measures, finding minimum imbalances in the records. In addition, we take 
into account adjustment factors to correct for splits. Moreover, we omit the trading activity of 
investors classified as “ADRs” (American Depository Receipts), since we cannot tell which group 
of investors owns such transactions, which are performed by brokerage firms on behalf of ADR 
investors. Those trades make up approximately 4,75% of the overall trading value on the stock 
exchange. Finally, we complete this database with the daily high, low, opening and closing prices 
from Bloomberg. 
Second, to account for market microstructural effects on volatility, we use a hand-collected 
intraday database from Bloomberg, which encompasses trades and quotes for the 42 most traded 
Colombian stocks. Specifically, it includes data on price and volume for transactions and tick-by-
tick data on price and depth for quotes (bid and ask), from August 23, 2010 to August 31, 2012. 
The Colombian stock market operates most of the time as a continuous order-driven market, but it 
switches to a call auction at the closing (last five minutes) and after large price changes (called 
“volatility call auctions”), as described by Agudelo, Gutierrez and Múnera (2014). Since we are 
only interested in the intraday volatility associated with the continuous market, we omit the data 
belonging to both types of call auction. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Daily volatility model  
Daily stock volatility is usually estimated using ARCH-GARCH and/or stochastic volatility 
models. Nevertheless, ex post measures suggest that the volatility estimations of the first group do 
not explain the variability in ex post returns (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998). In turn, the second 
group provides inefficient estimators that contain highly non-Gaussian measurement errors, 
leading to wrong statistical inference (Alizadeh, Brandt and Diebold., 2002). Thus, in this study, 
we use a simple measure of daily volatility-based intraday ranges, with properties of efficiency 
and consistency well backed up by the specialized literature (Alizadeh et al., 2002; Andersen and 
Bollerslev, 1998; Yang and Zhang, 2000). Volatility range-based measures have been used by 
related studies such as Wang (2007) and Chiang and Wang (2011). Specifically, the log range 
measure is the logarithmic difference between the high and low prices in a day: 
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ln�𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ _𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� − ln �𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�         [1] 
We measure the effect of both domestic groups and foreigners on stock volatility [1] by 
estimating the following panel data regression of the log of volatility against trading activity 
variables. Similar specifications are by Wang (2007) and Kyröläinen (2008). 
 
ln�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� = 𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙ln (𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑙𝑙)𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘4𝑘𝑘=1 + �∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖=1  ln (1 + 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)� + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡        [2] 
 
where 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the stock price volatility. 𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 indicates macro and stock control variables18, namely, 
systematic volatility and foreign exchange rate volatility, contemporaneous and one-lag daily stock 
returns; 𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 corresponds to a dummy variable for day of the week (excluding weekends)19; 𝑗𝑗 is the 
type of investor (foreign, institutional, and individual). The variable of interest, 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , represents 
the trading activity variable by each type of investor, initially measured as total traded value. 
Finally, volatility lags account for the well-known persistence of volatility (Kyröläinen, 2008). 
 
4.2  Intraday volatility models  
Taking advantage of the intraday trading database described above, we are able to decompose 
volatility into two components: fundamental and transitory (Harris, 2003). Fundamental volatility 
refers to price variations due to changes in fundamental factors that alter the stock economic value. 
On the other hand, transitory volatility is unrelated to fundamentals and comes from the trading 
activity itself and microstructural effects, for example, the bid-ask bounce of trading prices (Roll, 
1984) and the post-trade price reversal (Huang and Stoll, 1996). In this respect, in a simple model 
following the spirit of Roll (1984) and Bandi and Russell (2006), total volatility [1] can be 
approximately decomposed as the sum of the log of mid-price volatility, the measure of 
                                                      
18 As macro control variables, we included the main stock market index (COLCAP) and foreign exchange rate 
volatilities. Both volatilities are measured as in Equation [1]. We control for systematic volatility, a well-known 
determinant of the total stock volatility (Campbell et al., 2001).  In turn, controlling for the volatility of the exchange 
rate takes care of effects on stock valuation coming from the unhedged exposition to foreign exchange risk at the firm 
level. Moreover, by including macro-level factors, we control for any effect of total net buys on market-wide volatility 
that might drive the results at the stock level. As alternative macro control variables, we also try the VIX index, the 
volatility of the S&P500 index, the TED spread and dummies for days of macroeconomic events, but adding them 
only increases the R-square by less than 1%. 
19 Kyröläinen (2008) notes that Mondays may involve greater volatility than other trading days due to information 
events that occurred over the weekend. 
fundamental volatility, and the log of the bid-ask spread, proxy of the transitory volatility20.Thus, 
an alternative specification for equation [2] is: 
 
ln �𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� = 𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙ln (𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑙𝑙)
𝐿𝐿
𝑙𝑙=1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘4𝑘𝑘=1 +      �∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖=1 ln (1 + 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)� + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡    
[3] 
where 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, the mid-price volatility, is calculated as the daily average of log range measures 
[1], estimated in five-minute intervals. The bid-ask spread, 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, can be alternatively 
measured as the daily average of the quoted or the effective bid-ask spread, both estimated from 
transaction and quote data. The quoted spread is computed as the daily average of differences 
between the ask and bid prices scaled by the mid-price and measured at five-minute intervals (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡), 
as follows. 
 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚 �
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
�   [4] 
The effective spread is defined as twice the absolute value of the logarithm of the trade price 
relative to the mid-price averaged for each stock-day, where 𝜏𝜏 is a given transaction in the day: 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝_𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚 �2 ∗ ln (
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏
)�   [5] 
The quoted spread measures the potential cost of buying or selling in trades smaller than the 
ask or bid depth, respectively. In turn, the effective spread reflects the difference between the 
effective cost at which investors trade relative to the mid-price (Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka, 
                                                      
20 Assuming, first,  that trades happen randomly at the bid or ask prices, and, second, that there exists a constant 
proportional bid-ask spread, it is easy to show that starting from [1], 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ_𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
�1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤_𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ �1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�, we can decompose total volatility into its 
fundamental and transitory components: ln�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� ≈ 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ln(1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡). 
2009). This measure accounts for the fact that some trades occur inside the quoted spread and that 
large trades have a price impact. 
To test the relation between transitory volatility and investors’ trading activity, we regress both 
measures of the bid-ask spread against trading activity and its determinants as follows: 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙ln (𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1)𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘4𝑘𝑘=1 + �∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖=1 ln (1 + 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)� + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡    
[6] 
The extant literature (e.g., Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston, 2004; Hendershott and Molton, 2011) 
has identified the following determinants of the bid-ask spread: the stock return 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, the stock 
volatility 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, and the stock price level 𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. Trading activity is also an important 
determinant of bid-ask spreads, but here, it is measured for each of the three types of investors: 
foreigners, local institutions and local individuals, 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. We also include day dummies, 𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘. 
Partially based on Grullon et al., (2004), we use an alternative measure of liquidity, the daily 
averaged quote depth. We define it as the average intraday quoted depth at the bid and ask prices 
in each quote update. Similar to [6], the model with this liquidity measure is the following: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙ln (𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1)𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘4𝑘𝑘=1 + �∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖=1 ln (1 + 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)� + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡    
[7] 
 We overcome three possible complications in our econometric estimation. First, the two 
components of trading activity, the average size of the trades and the number of transactions, might 
have different effects on the alternative measures of volatility and liquidity presented above. In 
response, we run alternative specifications of models [2], [3], [6] and [7], substituting the log of 
the total traded value by the type of investor, with the logs of the number of trades and the average 
trading value21. 
Second, the previous literature asserts a bi-directional relation between volatility and the bid-
ask spread. One might expect that a higher bid-ask spread leads to a larger bid-ask bounce that in 
turns contributes to a higher volatility (Roll, 1984). In addition, higher volatility induces larger 
bid-ask spreads in the theoretical model of Kyle (1985). To manage this potential endogeneity, we 
perform 2-stage least squares regressions to estimate models [3], [6] and [7], using instruments for 
the volatility, spread and quoted depth, respectively. 
Finally, since our data have a large T dimension, potential cross-sectional and autocorrelation 
of errors are expected. In response, we run the panel data models using Driscoll and Kraay’s 
covariance matrix estimator (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998), which provides a heteroskedasticity- and 
autocorrelation-consistent covariance matrix (Hoechle, 2007). This approach is consistent 
independently of the panel’s cross-sectional and temporal dimensions. 
 
4.3 Alternative measures of intraday volatility   
As a robustness test, we estimate three alternatives measures of fundamental volatility that mitigate 
the inherent microstructural noise from high-frequency data22. First, we employ the bipower 
variation estimator proposed by Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004) as being robust to finite 
jumps. The estimator is calculated from the cumulative sum of the products of adjacent absolute 
returns from trading prices, sampled at five-minute intervals (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡), as follows: 
 
                                                      
21 Since 𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘 = 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘/𝑁𝑁_𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘, taking logs, we have a linear decomposition of 
trading activity:  ln (𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘) = ln (𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘) + ln (𝑁𝑁_𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘) 




∑ | ln𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 − ln𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘−1 |𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘=3 | ln𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘−1 − ln𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘−2 |       [8] 
Second, we estimate the two-scale realized volatility measure (TSRV), which is robust to 
trading frictions (such as bid-ask bounces), informational effects and measurement or data 
recording errors (misplaced prices), which are latent sources of noise (At-Sahalia, Mykland, and 
Zhang, 2011). Furthermore, the authors claim that in the presence of market microstructure noise, 
this measure mitigates the variance of the noise derived from too frequent sampling of prices (e.g., 





∑ 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔=1 (𝑉𝑉, 𝛿𝛿)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 −  
𝑛𝑛(𝛿𝛿)𝑔𝑔
𝑛𝑛
𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸(𝑉𝑉, 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                    [9] 
where 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸(𝑉𝑉, 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓)𝑡𝑡 is the realized volatility with the fast time scale estimated with prices sampled 
at 𝑚𝑚 intervals. In turn, 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔(𝑉𝑉, 𝛿𝛿)𝑡𝑡 represents the volatilities estimated with 𝐺𝐺 (=𝛿𝛿/𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓) different 
samplings with the slow time scale, each one with prices sampled at 𝑚𝑚(𝛿𝛿)𝑔𝑔 intervals (= 𝑚𝑚 𝐺𝐺⁄ ). 
Each volatility is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔(𝑉𝑉, 𝛿𝛿)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ (ln  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘
𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛(𝛿𝛿)𝑔𝑔
𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘=2 − ln  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘−1
𝑔𝑔 )2                                [10] 
𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸(𝑉𝑉, 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ ( ln𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛
𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘=2 − ln𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘−1
𝑓𝑓 )2                                   [11] 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘
𝑔𝑔  and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓  represent the trading prices sampled at the slow and fast time scales, 
respectively. For our analysis, we choose a sampling interval of 5 minutes (𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓) for the fast sampling 
and 30 minutes (𝛿𝛿) for the slow one (Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys, 2001; At-Sahalia 
et al., 2011).  
The third and last alternative measure is the median realized volatility 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉 estimator 
proposed by Andersen, Dobrev, and Schaumburg, (2012). This measure is an improvement over 
the bipower variation estimator (Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004)) that corrects for a 
possible upward bias but preserves jump robustness. The authors argue that the new measure leads 
to better efficiency properties and is less susceptible to the presence of zero returns in the sample. 






� ∗ ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆(�Δ𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘, �Δ𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘−1�, �Δ𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘−2�)�
2𝑛𝑛−1
𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘=2            [12] 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Summary statistics  
Table 1 presents the summary data for of the trading of each of the three groups of investors in the 
Colombia Stock Exchange, for the whole sample and for each of the four quartiles of market 
capitalization. Panel A displays the results for the daily average trade value in US dollars. Overall, 
local institutions are responsible for more than half of the total traded value in the whole sample, 
3,5 and 1,5 times more than the value traded by foreigners and individuals, respectively. Local 
institutions are responsible for most of the trading in value in each of the top three quartiles of size, 
while in the lowest quartile, individual investors are the dominant group. Barber, Odean, & Zhu 
(2008) also report that local individuals are the more active traders in small-cap stocks for the US 
market. In contrast, foreigners have the smallest share of the daily average trade value in the whole 
sample and in each of the four quartiles of size. Since trading activity, measured as traded value, 
depends on both of the number of trades and the average trade value, we examine both variables 
separately. 
 
When we measure trading activity by number of trades, local institutions and individuals switch 
places, as shown in Panel B. The largest share belongs to local individuals, with 1,5 and 4,4 times 
more average trades than local institutions and foreigners, respectively. In turn, Panel C presents 
the results for average trade value, which is the largest for local institutions, followed by foreigners 
and individual investors. Barber et al., (2008), Choe et al., (2005) and Dvořák (2005) report similar 
results in those two variables in Taiwan, Korea and Indonesia, respectively. Overall, the results in 
Table 1 do not unambiguously suggest whose trading activity raises volatility the most. It may be 
institutions, with the largest trades and value traded, or individuals, with the most frequent trades.  
The evolution of trading activity by the three groups can be appreciated in the plot of the share 
of trading (in dollar value) over the sampled time. We observe that whereas the share of trading of 
local institutions remains relatively constant, there are clear trends for the other two groups. After 
early 2009, individuals progressively make up a lower share of the total trading, whereas 
foreigners’ share continues to grow. Moreover, in November of 2012, the debacle of the most 
important Colombian brokerage house, Interbolsa, due to a liquidity crisis caused by failed highly 
leveraged trades, is a factor that weakened the confidence of retail traders in the stock market 
(BVC, 2012).   
In turn, Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the daily volatility of individual stocks and 
the market index. Average volatility is higher for the smallest firms, in line with the results of 
Chang and Fong (2000), for both NYSE and NASDAQ. Similarly, we obtain a somewhat higher 
volatility autocorrelation in the lowest quartile. The differences in the share of trading and 
volatility by firm size in Tables 1 and 2 and the varying composition of the trading in Figure 1 
motivate us to conduct some of the analyses below separately by size quartiles and to split the 
sample period in half. In addition, the high autocorrelation in volatility requires the use of a panel 
data model with volatility lags, as explained in section 4.1.  
 
5.2 Differential effects on stock volatility  
We estimate the effects of trading activity on volatility using the panel data model [2] at the stock-
day level. We present alternative specifications of this base model in Tables 3, 4 and 5. As 
explained above, in each case, we report the results for the whole sample, the two halves of the 
sample period, and each of the four size quartiles. Table 3 describes the results of regressing the 
daily stock volatility against the total traded value by type of investor. First, we note that the 
explanatory variables have the expected signs: stock volatility is positively related to the market 
and foreign exchange rate volatilities and to the three trading activity variables 23. Most 
remarkably, the trading activity of individuals has the largest positive coefficient, a result that is 
robust in both subperiods and in each of the four size quartiles. Using Wald tests, we find that the 
trading value coefficients for individuals are statistically larger than those for the other two groups. 
This suggests that individuals are the main drivers of volatility, even in the period 2012-2016, 
when they fall to the last place in the overall share of trading (see Figure 1). This result agrees with 
the evidence for the Finnish market reported by Kyröläinen (2008) and for NYSE by Kaniel et al., 
(2008). It is also consistent with H1 that proposes that individual investors are the main inducers 
of volatility, as they mostly act as noise traders. However, further analysis is required to better 
understand this relation.   
On the other hand, the trading of both foreign and local institutions also drives up volatility 
but to a lesser extent than the trading of individuals. For example, for the total sample, the 
coefficient for individual trading is 4 and 13 times larger than the coefficients for the trading of 
                                                      
23  In omitted day-of-the-week effects, we find that Fridays tend to be more volatile in Colombia, unlike 
Kyröläinen (2008), who finds that Mondays tend to be more volatile.  
institutions and foreigners, respectively24. We interpret this lower effect on volatility as suggesting 
that both groups have a stabilizing role in stock volatility (H2 and H3). Similar findings have been 
reported by Black (1986) and De Long et al., (1990) for institutions and by Holmes & Wong, 
(2001) and Lin et al., (2009) for foreigners.  
To further explore these relations, we decompose the total traded value of each group into the 
number of trades and average trade value and replace it with these measures in model [2], as 
reported in Table 4. The positive and highly significant coefficients of the number of trades for 
each type of investor and in each of the seven samples indicates that this variable is the key driver 
of volatility, consistent with the findings of Jones, et.al (1994) in NASDAQ. This effect is larger 
for individual’s activity, supporting H1. In addition, as presented in the Wald tests, this effect is 
significantly different from the effect from either of the other two groups at the 1% level in almost 
all cases, supporting the stabilizing role of both institutions (H2 and H3).  
 In contrast, the effect of the average trade value on volatility runs in the opposite direction. The 
coefficient for the average trade value is negative and statistically significant in six out of seven 
samples for foreigners. Similarly, local institutions’ average trade value has negative impact on 
stock volatility, especially in the second period and in the two smaller size quartiles. This is 
consistent with the mitigating role of those two types, discussed in H2 and H3: when controlling 
by number of trades, larger trades by professional investors are not disruptive of prices but, on the 
contrary, tend to reduce price variability. This corroborates the findings by  Holmes and Wong 
(2001) and Lin et al., (2009) in East Asian stock markets. At the microstructural level, an anecdotal 
                                                      
24 Notably, the large difference in the coefficients of foreign trading activity in the two subperiods increases fivefold 
from 0,0022 (2007-2011) to 0,0109 (2012-2016). This might be related to the increasing role of foreigners in the 
total trading activity of the stock market over time, as shown in Figure 1. 
explanation for this negative effect of large institutional trades on volatility is the general practice 
of cross-trading between large firms at the mid price, as well as trading in the closing call auction25. 
We also explore the differential effects of buying and selling trading activity on volatility. 
Specifically, we replace the total traded value for each group by the traded values in buys and sells 
in model [2], as presented in Table 5 26. We observe that the effect of both types of trading for 
each of the three groups is positive in all 42 cases and statistically significant at the 1% level in all 
except two cases. In addition, when comparing the corresponding effect of buys (sells) of 
foreigners and local institutions with that of individual buys (sells), Wald tests indicate that the 
latter is always higher than the former, a difference that is statistically significant in all cases but 
one (one). This evidence provides additional support to the three hypotheses of this study.  
The results also allow us to contrast the differential effects between sells and buys for the same 
type of investor. Table 5 shows that the coefficients for sells are larger than those for the respective 
buys for each of the three types of traders in the seven samples, with only three exceptions. In 
omitted Wald tests, we find that this difference is significant at the 10% level or lower for 11 out 
of 21 cases and that in no case is the effect of buys significantly larger than of sells. This evidence 
agrees with previous studies, such as Hamao and Wei (2001) for Japan and Wang (2007) for 
Thailand, that report such an asymmetric effect of sells over buys on volatility.  
A final noteworthy result in Table 5 is that the coefficient of foreign sales is not larger than that 
corresponding to local individuals and institutions. This does not support the disruptive effect on 
volatility attributed to foreigners by Wang (2007) in two Asian markets. Aside from the fact that 
                                                      
25 We thank Jairo J. Agudelo from Valores Bancolombia and Gregorio Toro at AdCap for this insight.  
26 A limitation of this analysis is that the available data do not differentiate between active and passive buys (sells) 
by type of investor. According to the studies on limit order markets, active sells and/or buys are the ones that should 
change prices and have a definite effect on volatility (Chang and Fong, 2000).  
 
both studies use data well before ours (up to 1999), this difference could be attributed to the fact 
that the first study uses data at the country-month level and that neither of them observes the 
trading activity of the other two types of investors27. Moreover, our result is consistent with the 
results from Holmes and Wong (2001) and Lin, Lee, and Chiu (2009) on the effect of market 
liberalization measures in East Asian markets. In any case, we test below for the robustness of this 
finding with alternative specifications and focus on times of crisis.  
 
5.3 Differential effects on stock market volatility with intraday data  
In this section, we study the effects of trading by the three groups in intraday data on volatility and 
liquidity measures calculated from the trade and quote sample described in section 3. This will 
serve as a robustness test of the results in the previous section and will provide additional insight 
on the microstructural factors driving the volatility-volume relation. These four measures are 
estimated with intraday data for a sample of two years. We estimate both the total daily (transitory) 
volatility and the mid-price (fundamental) volatility with the daily average of log range measure 
[1] applied to transaction prices and mid-prices, respectively. The effective bid-ask spread is 
estimated by trade as [5] and daily averaged. The depth measure is the daily average of the depths 
at the bid and the ask in each updated quote. Table 6 summarizes the effects of investor trading 
activity on the total and fundamental volatilities according to model [3] and the two measures of 
liquidity, namely, bid-ask spread and quoted depth, according to models [4] and [5], respectively. 
 
                                                      
27 For example, assuming that individuals are the main drivers of volatility and observing only foreign net sells in 
times of high volatility, missing data on the trades of the other two groups, one would wrongly infer that foreign 
outflows are inducing volatility.  
We first examine the results of transitory volatility in column (1). They are qualitatively the 
same as the results in Table 1: trading by each of the three groups induces volatility. This effect is 
significantly larger for individuals than for local institutions, whose effect in turn is larger than 
that of foreigners. Since we control for liquidity with an instrument of the bid-ask spread, the 
increasing volatility is not explained in principle by microstructural effects, such as the bid-ask 
bounce of Roll (1984) or informed trading driving up the bid-ask spread or the price impact (Kyle, 
1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). 
Column (2) displays the results for fundamental volatility, the variability of the mid price, which 
by construction is less influenced by microstructural effects than the transitory volatility is. The 
effect on that measure of volatility by individual trading remains positive and statistically 
significant, as in column (1) and Tables 3 to 5. Interestingly, the effect of foreigners is no longer 
statistically significant, and that of local institutions is significant at only the 10% level. This is 
consistent with retail trading creating noise to a larger extent than the two groups of institutions, 
along the lines of the findings by Kaniel et al (2008) and De Long et al (1989).  
Next, we explore the effects on the intraday liquidity measures. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 
6 present the results of equations [6] and [7] using the effective bid-ask spread and depth, 
respectively. As described in section 4.2, we control for intraday volatility with an instrumental 
variable since we want to isolate any indirect effects on liquidity from volatility. The effect of each 
group in both dimensions of liquidity is positive: the coefficients in the spread model are negative 
for the trading of the three groups and statistically significant for the two local groups. The 
coefficients in the depth model are positive and statistically significant for each type of investor28. 
                                                      
28 The results of trading activity and of the three control variables volatility, log of price and return agrees with 
previous panel data results for liquidity (Grullon, Kanatas, & Weston, 2004; De Cesari, Espenlaub, & Khurshed, 
2011; Hendershott & Moulton, 2011). 
Interestingly, as in volatility, the effect of individuals on liquidity is positive and significantly 
larger than that of local institutions, which is higher than that of foreigners, as indicated by the 
results of the Wald tests. The effect of individuals on liquidity is several times larger than the effect 
of institutions, both in the bid-ask spread and in the depth. This increased liquidity associated with 
retail trading can be explained by retail traders acting as the main liquidity providers, as reported 
by Agudelo et al (2019) in Colombia, by Lee et al. (1999) in Taiwan and by Barber and Odean 
(2001) in the US. Chordia, Roll, & Subrahmanyam (2001) also report that depth rises when trading 
activity comes from uninformed investors. Overall, the evidence of Table 6 is consistent in 
presenting individuals as the main drivers of volatility, while at the same time, they are the most 
responsible for liquidity (H1). 
To further explore these relations, we again decompose the trading activity into two 
components, average trade value and number of trades for each type of investor, in the regressions 
of the intraday measures of volatility and liquidity, as presented in Table 7. Columns (1) and (2) 
reaffirm two findings of Table 4. First, the volatility-volume relation is driven more by the number 
of trades than by the average trade value. The Wald tests confirm that this differential effect is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Second, while the effect of the average trade value by 
individuals is positive, that is not the case for the two groups of institutions. Again, this suggests 
a more careful execution of larger orders by both foreigners and local institutions, while large 
trades by retail traders appear to induce more noise.  
In turn, columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 show that the positive effect of trading activity on 
liquidity, reported in Table 6, appears to come from both the number of trades of the three groups 
and the average retailer trade value, in terms of reduced spreads and larger depths. Since our trade 
and quote data cannot distinguish between active and passive trades by type of investor, we cannot 
be sure whose trading is providing liquidity. However, the results are consistent with the finding 
that the three groups contributing to liquidity, but retail traders contribute even more, especially 
with large passive orders.  
 In the absence of more detailed data, the results in Tables 6 and 7 are consistent with two 
nonmutually exclusive explanations of individual trading. First, individuals appear to be less 
informed, as their trading induce more volatility, both transitory and fundamental, and presumably 
lowers the adverse selection component of the spread. That intraday retail trading spurs volatility 
has also been reported in the US (Campbett et al, 2001) and Finland (Kyröläinen, 2008). Second, 
at least an important group of individual traders has a passive trading style and is important for 
liquidity provision. For example, such traders might be using more nonmarketable limit orders 
and/or behave as reversal traders. This behavior has been reported with transaction data in the US 
(Kaniek et al, 2008) and Taiwan (Lee et al, 2004). Both explanations render further support to H1. 
We offer some confirmatory evidence of the differences in trading style below in section 5.4.  
With respect to the two institutional groups, local and foreigners, the results in Table 6 and 7 
reflect a less intrusive effect on volatility, particularly on fundamental volatility, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that institutions have superior information (H2). They also 
contribute to liquidity but to a lesser extent than individuals do. Moreover, in those intraday 
models, we fail to find that foreign trading has any large volatility effect, unlike some previous 
literature. To confirm this result, in the robustness test, we study whether foreign sells, particularly 
in times of financial stress, have an important impact on the volatility of the Colombian stock 
market in section 5.5.  
 
As a robustness test of the effects of trading on volatility, in Table 8, we report the results of 
the panel data model [3], using the alternative intraday measures of volatility introduced in section 
4.3, while controlling for liquidity effects. Column (1) repeats the results of the mid-price 
(fundamental) volatility of Table 6 (column 2). Columns (2), (3) and (4) show the results with the 
bipower variation estimator [8], two-scale realized volatility measure [9] and median realized 
volatility [12], respectively. These four measures have been proposed as a way to mitigate the 
trading noise in the estimation of volatility based on transactional data.  
We observe qualitatively the same results as those in the previous tables. Individual trading is 
clearly and by far the most directly associated with volatility for each of the four intraday measures. 
The coefficients of individual trading are between 5 and 15 times higher than those of the follower, 
the local institution trading. The difference is statistically significant, as shown by the Wald test. 
This effect is statistically significant even for the median realized volatility [12] by Andersen et al 
(2012) in column (4), arguably the measure that better controls for microstructural effects. 
Interestingly, the coefficients of the three types of traders are statistically significant, explaining 
this volatility measure, even though the effect of the market volatility is not significant, and the R2 
of the regression is just 0,059.  
 
5.4 Trading execution by type of trader.  
Since we have interpreted the results of Tables 6-8 in terms of possible differences in trading style 
and degree of information among the three groups, here we explore some corroborating evidence. 
Specifically, the BVC database allows us to measure the average trading cost for each group and 
for buys and sells separately at the stock-day level. In addition, we measure the daily performance 
of each group as a proxy of information differences.  
 
We use a very simple measure of average buying (selling) cost, defined as the difference 
between the volume-weighted average daily buy (sell) price by investor “j” in stock “i”, relative 
to the volume-weighted average price for the stock-day, as follows:  
 
𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝_𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏_𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = (𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴_𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 −  𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴__𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) /𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴__𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡         [13] 
𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝_𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = (𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴__𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  − 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴__𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) /𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴__𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡       [14] 
A positive (negative) value of 𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝_𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏_𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 (𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝_𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) implies as a more 
aggressive style of trading by a group of investors, with more frequent use of liquidity-demanding 
orders and less liquidity provision, or an intraday momentum style, with buying (selling) more at 
prices above (below) the average price of the trading session.  
The results of trading cost measures [13] and [14] are presented in Table 9 for all three groups 
and for the total sample and the four size quartiles. To maintain comparability with the results of 
Tables 6-8, we restrict this estimation to the same period from August 23, 2010 to August 31, 
2012. We observe that overall, both local groups, individuals and institutions, have negative 
buying and selling average costs. This negative cost is statistically significant in the whole sample 
and in most size quartiles. When comparing trading costs between them, t-test reveals that there is 
no statistically significant difference for sales (except a minor one in quartile 2). In contrast, the t-
tests show that individuals buy at lower average prices than institutions, a difference significant at 
the 1% level in the overall sample and size quartiles. As expected, the remaining investor group, 
foreigners, has a positive cost for both buys and sells that is statistically significant at the 1% level 
in the whole sample and in each of the four size quartiles. These results render support to the 
argument presented in section 5.2: Individuals are the main liquidity providers in the Colombian 
stock market, especially for incoming selling orders from other groups. Institutions are in second 
place in liquidity provision, while foreigners are clearly liquidity demanding traders.  
Next, we measure the short-term performance by group, particularly timing, as a proxy for 
informed trading. Adapting a measure first proposed by Dvořák (2005), we estimate the daily 
performance as a function of the net buy of a type of investor “j” in a stock “i” multiplied by the 
next-day return of this stock, measured by the volume-weighted average prices, as follows:  
 
𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏_𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚 (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡_𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) × �
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉__𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉__𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
− 1�           [15] 
A positive performance of a group of investors corresponds to an average good timing; i.e., the 
investors mostly buy on days before the price rises, and they mostly sell on days before the prices 
drop. Note that this measure is unaffected by the average buying or selling cost, [11] and [12], so 
it depends on only timing, the correct anticipation of the return the next day.  
 The results of this measure, summarized in Table 10, present contradictory results for the two 
local groups. On the one hand, local institutions have the best performance, with a positive average 
performance for the whole sample and the four size quartiles that is statistically significant in all 
cases but that of the largest stocks. This evidence is consistent with local institutions possessing 
an edge in terms of short-lived information. In contrast, local individuals present a consistent 
negative performance, which in all five cases is statistically significant at the 1% or 5% levels. 
This poor timing can be explained by individuals’ less informed trading or alternatively by their 
passively providing liquidity to informed traders of the two other groups, i.e., selling (buying) with 
standing limit orders to investors that correctly anticipate prices going up (down). Finally, the 
performance of foreigners is not much different from zero. Their average performance, while 
positive, is three times lower than the performance of local institutions and only marginally 
significant in two out of five cases. This result is consistent with the idea that foreigners do not 
have much of an information edge in the Colombian market but neither do they have a 
disadvantage.  
Taking together, the results in Tables 9 and 10 lend credit to the explanation provided in section 
5.3: Local individuals are the main liquidity providers of the Colombian Stock Market and 
represent most of the noise traders, with an inferior performance evident in poor timing. This is 
consistent with the evidence of individual trading as the main driver of both daily and intraday 
volatility and liquidity, discussed in H1 (Section 2). In the same line, Lee et al (2004) and Barber 
et al. (2009) report that individuals are the main liquidity providers and noise traders in Taiwan, 
and Choi and Choi (2018) report that individual trading generates systematic noise trading in 
Korea.  
Institutions, in turn, are good at executing trades and appear to have an information advantage, 
at least at a daily frequency. Validating evidence of this is provided by Agudelo et al (2019) for 
BVC, who use performance measures in monthly and yearly periods and find a positive relation 
between institutional trading and the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. Barber et 
al. (2008) also present evidence of superior performance and trading execution by local institutions 
in Taiwan, which they attribute to superior information. Using quarterly institutional holdings in 
32 countries, Ferreira, Matos, Pereira, and Pires (2017) report that local institutions have superior 
performance than foreigners, and their behavior is consistent with superior information, especially 
in countries with higher information asymmetry and lower investor protection. Consistent with 
H2, informed trading by local institutions can explain why their trading creates less volatility than 
that of individuals, in spite of their greater share of trading and larger average trading value. 
Finally, foreigners are aggressive traders, paying larger average transaction costs for both buys 
and sells. In terms of performance, they appear in the middle, as we may expect if they have no 
information edge, unlike local institutions, and if they are not noise traders providing liquidity for 
informed investors, unlike local individuals. The more aggressive trading style of foreigners has 
also been documented in intraday data in Korea by Choe et al., (2005), with daily stock-data in 
Colombia by Agudelo et al (2019), and indirectly, as price pressure at market-day level, by Griffin 
et al (2004) for a group of six Asian emerging markets. Finally, the trading executing evidence on 
the two institutional groups, foreigners and locals, is also consistent with the hypothesis that their 
trading does not create as much volatility as that of individuals because their trading is relatively 
more informed and does not provide much liquidity due to their more aggressive trading style, 
consistent with H2 and H3.  
 
5.5  The effect of foreigners during times of financial stress.  
As discussed in H3, the previous literature does not suggest a clear expected effect of foreigners 
on stock volatility in an emerging market. On the one hand, some early studies indicate that large 
foreign flows, especially net selling, create excess volatility (Bae et al, 2004; Wang, 2007). On the 
other hand, foreigners are almost exclusively institutional investors, so we should expect that, as 
with local institutions, their trading has a lower effect on volatility than trading by individuals. 
Moreover, the results presented so far indicate that foreigners are the group of investors that is 
least responsible for volatility in the Colombian Stock Market.  
 
As a robustness test, we investigate the effect of foreign trading in volatility during times of 
financial stress. This can be motivated in two ways. The literature on foreign flows has documented 
that international factors (“push factors”) drive foreign flows in and out of emerging markets 
(Griffin et al, 2004; Richards, 2005). In addition, there is evidence of volatility transmission from 
US markets to emerging ones, especially during financial crises (e.g., Weber, 2013; Rejeb and 
Arfaoui, 2016). Bringing these two ideas together, it is natural to assume that foreign flows might 
be responsible of volatility peaks in emerging markets, if only (or especially) during times of stress, 
when they might be transmitting volatility from developed markets through aggressive sells.  
We use the CBOE Market Volatility Index (VIX) as an indicator of worldwide financial stress. 
The VIX is a commonly used measure of market risk sentiment (Gromb and Vayanos, 2002). We 
use two alternative definitions for days of worldwide financial stress. First, we use days of high 
VIX, i.e., when this index is above the 90th percentile of its distribution in the sampled period. 
Second, we consider days with large VIX increases, i.e., when the daily change of VIX is above 
its corresponding 90th percentile. Note that the sample includes the subprime crisis from 2007-
2008 and the sovereign debt crisis of the Euro zone from 2009-2011, which both originated in 
developed markets and were periods where presumably, foreign flows could have transmitted 
volatility to emerging markets. Both crises involved many days of financial stress according to 
either definition.  
Table 11 presents the results of the panel data model [2] that focuses on times of financial stress. 
Column (1) reproduces the base result in the total sample for comparison purposes (column 1, 
Table 3). columns (2) and (3) present the results of the model restricted to high VIX days. columns 
(4) and (5), in turn, display the results for days with large VIX increases. In columns (3) and (5), 
we remove the volatilities of the stock market index and the foreign exchange rate as explanatory 
variables to check the results when not controlling for market-wide volatility effects. Finally, 
columns (6) and (7) correspond to the model run on the whole sample but including a dummy 
variable for days of large VIX, 𝑆𝑆_ℎ𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ_𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻𝑣𝑣, as well as the interactions of the three trading variables 
with the dummy variable.  
The results in columns (2) to (5) show no qualitative difference from those presented so far. 
Trading by foreigners still has the lowest effect of the three types on stock volatility, even though 
the model focuses on a subsample of days of particular financial stress. This is true for both 
definitions of times of stress, and the differences between the groups of investors are highly 
significant in all cases (in omitted Wald tests). In columns (3) and (5), we examine the possibility 
that a higher effect of foreigners in times of stress might be subsumed by the market index or 
exchange rate volatilities by removing those two variables. However, this is not the case. The 
coefficient of foreign trading remains approximately the same in column (3) and increases in 
column (5), but in both cases, it is still well below the coefficients for the trading of both local 
groups. In turn, the results of the model with interacting variables, in columns (6) and (7), show 
that, as expected, times of stress are more volatile, as indicated by the highly significant and 
positive effect of the dummy variable. However, the interaction effect of the high VIX dummy 
with foreign trading, negative and highly significant, indicates again that foreign trading does not 
explain more volatility in those days, but rather the opposite. This is also true for local institutions, 
but not for local individuals. In unreported results, we also separate the trading variables by buys 
and sells and include interactions with the dummies of times of stress, but the results remain 
qualitatively the same: times of stress are intrinsically more volatile, independent of the trading 
patterns of the three groups of investors. Thus, we conclude that foreign trading is less related to 
increasing volatility than local trading in an emerging stock market such as BVC, even in times of 
financial stress. Although we find evidence that stocks are more volatile on those days, the relation 
of the trading of the three groups of investors to volatility is qualitatively similar to that of normal 
days. 
 
5.6  Effects of Short-Term vs Long-Term local institutions 
The BVC database allows us to decompose the institutional investor group into short-term and 
long-term firms. We group together brokerage firms and family offices as short-term institutional 
investors who actively trade in the Colombian stock market. Agudelo et al (2019) indicate that 
these two types of firms are responsible for approximately 69% the number of trades by Colombian 
institutions in the stock market. In the long-term category, we classify pension funds, insurance 
companies, mutual funds, investment trusts and investment companies. Given their ambiguous 
role in investment in a stock market, we exclude other financial intermediaries such as banks, 
which only removes 0,4% of the total trading value. As discussed in H2, we expect a lower effect 
on volatility by the trading activity of the long-term institutions. We hypothesize that their focus 
on the long term makes them more patient investors who are not so driven by the search for short-
term gains and who have a less aggressive style of trading than short-term firms.  
 We estimate the differential effects among the two groups of local institutions on intraday 
volatility and liquidity measures. For this, we run panel data models [2], [3], [6] and [7], replacing 
the institutions’ trading by the value traded by short-term and long-term investors. The results are 
presented in Table 12.  
We find that the short-term group has a larger effect on total volatility that is approximately 
two times greater than the effect of the long-term institutions, a highly statistically significant 
difference (column 1). As given by the Wald test, the effects of both groups of local institutions 
on volatility are significantly higher than the effects of foreigners but significantly lower than the 
effects of individuals. The effects are similar concerning fundamental volatility (column 2), with 
two exceptions: the effects of short-term institutions are no longer significantly higher than the 
effects of long-term institutions, which are in turn are no longer significantly higher than the effects 
of foreigners.   
Columns (3) and (4) report the coefficients of trading of the four groups in the panel data 
regressions of liquidity measures. The trading of the two types of local institutions contributes to 
smaller bid-ask spreads, with no great difference between them. Nevertheless, their effect is 
statistically higher than that of foreigners and lower than that of retail traders. The contribution to 
the depth from both local institutions is still positive but significantly larger for short-term firms 
than for long-term firms. 
In summary, the prior results show that the short-term institutional group has effects on 
volatility and liquidity that lie between those of long-term institutions and local individuals, 
preserving the relative order reported in sections 5.2 and 5.3. Compared with the trading by long-
term institutions, the trading by short-term institutions induces more volatility, both total and 
fundamental, but at the same time creates more liquidity, especially larger depths. Conversely, 
long-term firms exert more of a stabilizing effect on volatility. This is consistent with long-term 
institutions having a relative informational edge and a less disruptive trading style. Both findings 
are coherent with the average transaction costs and performance measures for both types of local 





This paper investigates the differential effects of three types of investors, local institutions, 
foreigners, and local individuals, on the trading activity in an emerging market. The results show 
that local individual trading has the largest effect on stock volatility, followed by trading by local 
institutions and finally trading by foreigners. This relative order is robust to testing selling and 
buying activities separately, examining the effect of average trade value and number of trades, 
splitting the sample period in two, testing it in four size quartiles, and using intraday measures of 
volatility. This is consistent with a characterization of individuals as “noise traders” and 
uninformed liquidity providers, as confirmed by their relative inferior daily performance and larger 
positive effect on two intraday measures of liquidity. The results are consistent with individuals, 
as a group, acting as boundedly rational agents, either trading for pure liquidity needs or wishfully 
thinking that they are acting on information. Of course, this does not rule out that there might be 
an important number of informed and successful retail traders, for example, acting on insider tips 
or using superior expertise on the market, as anecdotal evidence suggests. 
Focusing on the local institutional group, we find that short-term institutional investors tend to 
have an intermediate effect between the effect of long-term institutional investors and individuals. 
The long-term group and foreigners appear to be more sophisticated investors and more likely to 
be informed traders than individuals and short-term institutions and have a relative stabilizing role 
in the market. Foreigners appear to induce the least volatility, contrary to what is assumed by some 
of the previous literature. We find that this result is robust not only to the different samples and 
measures indicated above but also when the models focus on times of worldwide financial stress, 
as proxied by the VIX.  
In terms of regulatory prospects, since liquidity is a major concern in emerging markets, the 
results of this study suggest that exchanges should promote trading by retail investors, for the gains 
in liquidity, in spite of the loss in efficiency and the larger volatility. This is, of course, just a 
second-best solution that is appropriate for financial markets in the early stages of development. 
Ideally, as in developed markets, individuals should invest through institutions, such as funds, 
institutions should do most of the trading, and some specialized firms should act as designated 
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Figure 1 shows the market share of trading activity by each type of investor: local institutions, 
local individuals and foreigners; for the sample period from January 1, 2007 to January 29, 2016. 
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This table reports the summary statistics of trading by the three types of investors, for the overall 
market and for the four size quartiles, from January 1, 2007 to January 29, 2016, based on data 
provided by Colombia Stock Exchange (BVC). Two-tailed t-statistics for the mean differences 
between groups are provided. N: Number of stock-days.  *, **, ***: Statistical significance at the 













Total 43.479      855,5    122,6    -55,3 *** -40,3 *** 2.961,1  844,8    34,4 *** 1.923,4  567,3    
Q4 10.451      1.517,6  420,1    -40,7 *** -28,7 *** 5.370,6  2.173,4  24,7 *** 3.465,4  1.209,0  
Q3 14.819      1.023,5  269,4    -28,0 *** -13,3 *** 3.480,8  1.187,4  26,8 *** 1.768,9  556,4    
Q2 8.404        489,6    93,8      -29,9 *** -24,1 *** 1.551,2  669,4    10,1 *** 1.271,1  523,9    
Q1 9.805        209,6    0,1        -17,8 *** -19,4 *** 815,8    231,5    -5,7 *** 1.072,3  283,2    








Total 43.538      27,0      8          -95,9 *** -97,2 *** 80,2 41 -64,4 *** 117,7 55
Q4 10.461      43,1      17         -64,2 *** -57,6 *** 128,1 65 -38,8 *** 194,1 80
Q3 14.833      31,5      14         -45,7 *** -46,5 *** 85,2 46 -15,8 *** 94,2 48
Q2 8.414        22,0      8          -40,0 *** -40,0 *** 61,0 41 -28,9 *** 102,1 64
Q1 9.830        7,1        1          -58,0 *** -57,2 *** 38,0 19 -46,6 *** 85,3 36








Total 43.479      26,2 12,0 -3,4 ** 3,5 ** 30,2 20,2 57,9 *** 13,4 10,5
Q4 10.451      30,3 20,6 -16,8 *** 18,0 *** 38,2 29,5 40,6 *** 17,5 14,4
Q3 14.819      39,4 16,3 0,1 2,5 ** 36,8 25,3 42,4 *** 14,2 11,8
Q2 8.404        15,4 9,6 -15,6 *** -0,7 22,5 16,0 18,4 *** 11,3 8,4
Q1 9.805        10,9 0,1 -15,2 *** 0,2 18,2 10,8 20,1 *** 9,7 7,5
N
Local Individuals
Local IndividualsForeigners Local Institutions








Panel C: Value by trade  (US Dollars)
Foreigners Local Institutions Local Individuals
N
t -test 
(thousands) (thousands) (thousands) 






This table presents the summary statistics of daily volatility for Colombian stocks from January 1, 
2007 to January 29, 2016, for the whole sample and the four size quartiles. Volatility is measured 
as 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ln�𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ _𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� − ln (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) where 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ _𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
correspond to the maximum and minimum trading price of stock 𝐻𝐻 in day 𝑡𝑡, respectively. The 











44                  42.928           1,95% 1,84% 1,50% 39,6%
9                   10.404           1,72% 1,32% 1,40% 37,1%
10                  14.778           1,97% 1,90% 1,54% 35,4%
12                  8.319             1,78% 1,57% 1,38% 39,9%
13                  9.427             2,32% 2,32% 1,79% 43,8%
Daily stock volatility










This table reports the results of panel data models regressing the stock price volatility ln(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) against the traded value by type of investor, 
at daily frequency, as in [2]. Column (1) presents the results for the total sample from January 1, 2007 to January 29, 2016. Columns (2) 
and (3) present the corresponding results for the two half-periods. Columns (4) to (7) show the estimations for the four size quartiles. 
Wald tests that compare the three trading activity coefficients are reported. The panel data models are estimated with fixed effects and 
the Driscoll & Kraay (1998) covariance matrix estimator. The data come from the Colombia Stock Exchange (BVC) and Bloomberg. 
N: Number of stock-days. *, **, ***: Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: 
0,4148*** 0,4487*** 0,3868*** 0,2936*** 0,3755*** 0,4576*** 0,4924***
0,1053*** 0,0377*** 0,1742*** 0,1680*** 0,1071*** 0,0754*** 0,0910***
0,1894*** 1,4193*** 0,1018 0,1868*** 0,4601 -0,0345 0,0321
-0,4122 0,5052 -1,2419*** 0,1516 -0,4032 -1,0625** -0,4835
0,0082*** 0,0022*** 0,0109*** 0,0054*** 0,0051*** 0,0129*** 0,0070***
0,0276*** 0,0189*** 0,0471*** 0,0202*** 0,0190*** 0,0431*** 0,0276***
0,1097*** 0,1486*** 0,1041*** 0,1665*** 0,1649*** 0,0690*** 0,0695***
-4,7739*** -5,5185*** -4,9034*** -5,6871*** -5,9404*** -4,2799*** -3,7761***
N 36.820 17.401 19.419 6.858 7.540 13.084 9.338
R-squared 0,205 0,240 0,210 0,224 0,205 0,206 0,229
Number of stocks 37 29 30 11 7 10 9
Wald Test
43,04*** 25,99*** 29,90*** 13,12*** 4,167** 20,22*** 8,370***
139,9*** 134,9*** 19,78*** 66,98*** 110,3*** 4,737** 9,755***



















𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
















This table reports the results of the panel data models regressing the stock price volatility ln(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) against the average traded value and 
number of trades by type of investor, at daily frequency, as in [2]. Column (1) presents the results for the total sample from January 1, 
2007 to January 29, 2016. Columns (2) and (3) present the corresponding results for the two half-periods. Columns (4) to (7) show the 
estimations for the four size quartiles. Wald tests are reported comparing the coefficients for both number of trades and average traded 
value among the three types of traders. The panel data models are estimated with fixed effects and the Driscoll & Kraay (1998) covariance 
matrix estimator. The data comes from the Colombia Stock Exchange (BVC) and Bloomberg. N: Number of stock-days. *, **, ***: 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
Dependent variable: 
0,3818*** 0,4158*** 0,3457*** 0,3457*** 0,3566*** 0,4226*** 0,4703***
0,1094*** 0,0412*** 0,1663*** 0,1663*** 0,1040*** 0,0843*** 0,0958***
0,1135** 1,0110** 0,051 0,051 0,1738 -0,1955 -0,2196
-0,4700* 0,3623 -1,2221*** -1,2221*** -0,4208 -0,9016* -0,4363
0,0898*** 0,0304*** 0,0894*** 0,0894*** 0,1208*** 0,1085*** 0,0334***
0,1027*** 0,0723*** 0,1242*** 0,1242*** 0,1278*** 0,0931*** 0,1241***
0,1870*** 0,2454*** 0,1900*** 0,1900*** 0,1750*** 0,1400*** 0,0786***
-0,0069*** -0,0031*** -0,0043*** -0,0043*** -0,0140*** -0,0081*** -0,0003
-0,0049 0,0052 -0,0234*** -0,0234*** -0,0219*** -0,0044 -0,0052
-0,0072 -0,0105 0,0007 0,0007 0,0741*** -0,0205*** 0,0211
-2,9432*** -3,3043*** -2,7949*** -2,7949*** -4,2614*** -2,4373*** -2,8462***
N 36.820 17.401 19.419 19.419 7.540 13.084 9.338
R-squared 0,251 0,273 0,261 0,261 0,242 0,253 0,247
Number of stocks 37 29 30 30 7 10 9
Wald Test
2,48 13,33*** 9,723*** 9,72*** 0,14 1,15 28,89***
54,35*** 101,8*** 15,99*** 79,39*** 3,24* 7,31** 3,88**
202,4*** 304,1*** 79,39*** 15,99*** 14,08*** 5,58** 13,21***
0,317 5,064** 6,232** 6,23** 1,09 0,12 0,31
0,104 0,584 5,100** 5,10** 23,49*** 1,20 1,91



















ln 1 + 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
ln 1 + 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
ln 1 + 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
ln 1 + 𝑁𝑁_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
ln 1 + 𝑁𝑁_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
ln 1 + 𝑁𝑁_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑁_𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑁𝑁_𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑁_𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑁𝑁_𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑁_𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑁𝑁_𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
Table 5. Regressing stock volatility against buying and selling activity by type of investor 
 
 
This table reports the results of the panel data models regressing the stock price volatility ln(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) against traded value in both buys and 
sells by type of investor, at daily frequency, as in [2]. Column (1) presents the results for the total sample from January 1, 2007 to January 
29, 2016. Columns (2) and (3) present the corresponding results for the two half-periods. Columns (4) to (7) show the estimations for 
the four size quartiles. Wald tests that compare the three buying and three selling coefficients are reported. The panel data models are 
estimated with fixed effects and the Driscoll & Kraay (1998) covariance matrix estimator. The data come from the Colombia Stock 
Exchange (BVC) and Bloomberg. N: Number of stock-days. *, **, ***: Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.   
Dependent variable: 
0,4171*** 0,4479*** 0,3879*** 0,2910*** 0,3749*** 0,4606*** 0,4949***
0,1043*** 0,0410*** 0,1595*** 0,1694*** 0,1083*** 0,0740*** 0,0880***
0,2030*** 1,5312*** 0,1069* 0,1822*** 0,5315 0,1189 0,2628
-0,2821 0,6341 -1,1042*** 0,2505 -0,2823 -0,9652* -0,297
0,0052*** 0,0008 0,0079*** 0,0039*** 0,0048*** 0,0076*** 0,0025**
0,0120*** 0,0079*** 0,0266*** 0,0109*** 0,0097*** 0,0118*** 0,0107***
0,0294*** 0,0288*** 0,0291*** 0,0294*** 0,0447*** 0,0254*** 0,0210***
0,0072*** 0,0043*** 0,0071*** 0,0077*** 0,0055*** 0,0079*** 0,0060***
0,0163*** 0,0147*** 0,0170*** 0,0166*** 0,0133*** 0,0183*** 0,0131***
0,0389*** 0,0696*** 0,0340*** 0,0734*** 0,0749*** 0,0232*** 0,0241***
-3,8346*** -4,4268*** -3,9648*** -4,4146*** -4,9893*** -3,4814*** -3,0956***
N 36.820 17.401 19.419 6.858 7.540 13.084 9.338
R-squared 0,210 0,235 0,213 0,222 0,212 0,214 0,230
Number of stocks 37 29 30 11 7 10 9
Wald Test
17,35*** 14,61*** 27,11*** 8,36** 1,61 1,23 4,71**
56,90*** 36,61*** 0,39 22,50*** 33,31*** 7,20** 4,24**
188,08*** 77,92*** 88,96*** 56,33*** 67,59*** 35,50*** 28,86***
39,99*** 39,95*** 11,83*** 15,24*** 7,62** 9,95*** 3,63**
52,73*** 59,19*** 14,97*** 52,24*** 41,27*** 0,85 2,35



















ln 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 _𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
ln 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 _𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
ln 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 _𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
ln 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
ln 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡




𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡




This table reports the results of the panel data models regressing the measures of volatility and 
liquidity at the stock-day level against the trading value by type of investor and control variables. 
Column (1) presents the results for the model of stock price volatility [2], Column (2) the mid-
price volatility [3], Column (3) the effective spread [6], and Column (4) the average depth [7]. 
Wald tests that compare the three trading activity coefficients are reported. All models are 
estimated with the two-stage least squares method to account for the endogeneity between liquidity 
and volatility, fixed effects, and the Driscoll & Kraay (1998) covariance matrix estimator. The data 
come from the Colombia Stock Exchange (BVC) and Bloomberg from August 23, 1010 to August 
31, 2012. N: Number of stock-days. *, **, ***: Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 








0,3559 0,0207 -0,0079*** 3,2017***
0,0561***  -5,3919***
-0,0027***  2,2578*** 
0,0048*** 0 0 0,0068***
0,0361*** 0,0004* -0,0001** 0,0458***
0,2881*** 0,0058*** -0,0011*** 0,3003***
-10,4457*** -0,1128*** 0,0510*** 10,6049***
N 8.378 8.730 8.850 8.096
R-squared 0,271 0,065 0,106 0,468
Number of stocks 25 25 25 25
Wald Test
38,16*** 2,75* 43,92** 25,72***
107,18*** 109,32*** 63,47*** 88,86***
83,38*** 178,73*** 104,36*** 172,92***




𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡










This table reports the results of the panel data models regressing the measures of volatility and 
liquidity at the stock-day level against the average traded value and number of trades by type of 
investor and control variables. Column (1) presents the results for the model of stock price volatility 
[2], Column (2) the mid-price volatility [3], Column (3) the effective spread [6], and Column (4) 
the average depth [7]. Wald tests that compare the three coefficients for the number of trades and 
the three coefficients for the average traded value are reported. All models are estimated with the 
two-stage least squares method to account for the endogeneity between liquidity and volatility, 
fixed effects, and the Driscoll & Kraay (1998) covariance matrix estimator. The data come from 
the Colombia Stock Exchange (BVC) and Bloomberg from August 23, 2010 to August 31, 2012. 
N: Number of stock-days. *, **, ***: Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 







0,0244 0,0132 -0,0076** 2,8109***
0,0585*** -5,062***
-0,0028*** 2,0731***
0,0580*** 0,0003 0,0001 0,0434***
0,1268*** 0,0031*** -0,0004*** 0,2364***
0,3053*** 0,0069*** -0,0012*** 0,0706***
-0,0040** -0,0001 0 0,0015
0,0071 -0,0003 0 0,0024
0,1396*** 0,0015*** -0,0003** 0,5115***
-7,9442*** -0,0438*** 0,0446*** 9,4793***
N 8.378 8.730 8.850 8.096
R-squared 0,297 0,079 0,109 0,500
Number of stocks 25 25 25 25
Wald Test
19,57*** 22,10** 12,30*** 56,48***
54,94*** 19,58*** 12,53*** 20,28***
223,92*** 99,71*** 55,05*** 1,06
3,43** 0,84 0,02 0,01
53,05*** 12,58*** 6,56** 41,82***
78,47*** 13,53*** 5,63** 44,81***




ln 1 + 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
ln 1 + 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
ln 1 + 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
ln 1 + 𝑁𝑁_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
ln 1 + 𝑁𝑁_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
ln 1 + 𝑁𝑁_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑁_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑁_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑁𝑁_𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡





ln 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ln 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
 
Table 8. Regressing intraday volatility estimators against components of trading activity by 





This table reports the results of the panel data models regressing alternative intraday measures of 
volatility against the average traded value and number of trades by type of investor and control 
variables at the stock-day level. Column (1) presents the results for the model of stock price 
volatility [2], Column (2) the bipower variation measure [8], Column (3) the TSRV estimation [9], 
and Column (4) the median realized volatility [12]. Wald tests that compare the three trading 
activity coefficients are reported. All models are estimated with the two-stage least squares method 
to account for the endogeneity between liquidity and volatility, fixed effects, and the Driscoll & 
Kraay (1998) covariance matrix estimator. The data come from the Colombia Stock Exchange 
(BVC) and Bloomberg from August 23, 1010 to August 31, 2012. N: Number of stock-days. *, **, 
***: Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
  
Dependent variable: 
0,0027*** 0,0015*** 0,0021*** 0,0830
-0,0006 0,0005** -0,0002 0,02269
2,1422*** 0,8980*** 0,9058*** 77,3980***
0,01 0,0078 0,027** -0,7381
0,0207 -0,0089 -0,1637*** -3,1947
0 0,0000*** 0,0001*** 0,0059**
0,0004* 0,0006*** 0,0004*** 0,0130**
0,0058*** 0,0033*** 0,0037*** 0,1377***
-0,1128*** -0,0678*** 0,0687*** -2,4254**
N 8.730 7.715 4.786 7.773
R-squared 0,065 0,219 0,259 0,059
Number of stocks 25 23 23 23
Wald Test
38,16*** 45,99*** 11,50** 0,93
107,18*** 137,08*** 99,97*** 6,13***
83,38*** 253,80*** 169,42*** 7,56***




𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡_𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡




This table reports the summary statistics of the average trading cost at stock-day level (equations [13] and [14]) in both buys and sells 
for the three types of investors, for the overall market and for the four size quartiles. The data come from the Colombia Stock Exchange 
(BVC), from August 23, 1010 to August 31, 2012. Two-tailed t-statistics for the mean differences between groups are provided. N: 
Number of stock-days. N: Number of stock-days. *, **, ***: Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 




This table reports the summary statistics of the daily performance measures [15] for the three types of investors, for the overall market 
and for the four size quartiles. The data come from the Colombia Stock Exchange (BVC), from August 23, 1010 to August 31, 2012. 
Two-tailed t-statistics for the mean differences between groups are provided. N: Number of stock-days. N: Number of stock-days. *, **, 
***: Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Quartile N N N N N N
Total 7.093 0,10% *** 5.827 0,07% *** 9.543 -0,01% ** 9.470 -0,04% *** 9.777 -0,10% *** -15,3 *** 9.844 -0,03% *** 1,8
4 1.723 0,07% *** 1.456 0,06% *** 1.915 -0,02% *** 1.908 -0,02% * 1.930 -0,08% *** -7,2 *** 1.932 -0,03% *** -0,7
3 2.666 0,10% *** 2.193 0,07% *** 3.023 -0,03% *** 3.021 -0,04% *** 3.027 -0,12% *** -10,4 *** 3.051 -0,03% *** 0,6
2 1.493 0,11% *** 1.135 0,07% *** 2.205 0,00% 2.181 -0,04% ** 2.280 -0,08% *** -7,6 *** 2.284 0,00% 4,4 ***
1 1.211 0,15% *** 1.043 0,10% *** 2.400 0,02% 2.360 -0,04% * 2.540 -0,09% *** -7,0 *** 2.577 -0,05% *** -0,4











Total 9.668 0,02% 0,07% *** -0,11% ***
4 1.922 0,03% 0,02% -0,07% **
3 3.050 0,04% * 0,06% ** -0,13% ***
2 2.222 0,00% 0,06% * -0,09% **
1 2.474 0,01% 0,12% *** -0,14% ***
     
Mean Mean Mean
Local IndividualsLocal InstitutionsForeigners 
Table 11. Regressing stock volatility against total traded value by investor in times of financial stress 
 
 
This table reports the results of the panel data models regressing the stock price volatility ln(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) against the traded value by type of 
investor at daily frequency, as in [2], exploring the effects of trading on days of financial stress. Column (1) presents the results for the 
total sample from January 1, 2007 to January 29, 2016. Columns (2) and (3) show the results of the model restricted to days with high 
VIX values (above 90th percentile=32,85), and Columns (4) and (5) present the results restricted to the days with large daily changes in 
the VIX (above 90th percentile=1,85). Columns (6) and (7) show the results for the whole sample but include the dummy variable 
𝑆𝑆_ℎ𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ_𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻𝑣𝑣  for high VIX values (>32,85) and its interactions with the three trading activity variables. Volatilities are measured as 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 =
ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ _𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡) − ln (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡) where 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ _𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡) is the respective maximum (minimum) price. Panel data models 
are estimated with fixed effects and the Driscoll & Kraay (1998) covariance matrix estimator. The data come from the Colombia Stock 
Exchange (BVC) and Bloomberg. N: Number of stock-days. *, **, ***: Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Basic Model
0,4148*** 0,4687*** 0,4376*** 0,4120***-0,0089 -0,0203 -0,0209 -0,0088
0,1053*** 0,0286** 0,0679*** 0,1057***-0,007 -0,0143 -0,0133 -0,007
0,1894*** 0,663 -2,3489** 0,0321 -4,6316*** 0,1882*** 0,0244-0,0633 -0,7765 -1,0282 -0,8997 -0,9671 -0,0615 -0,0844
-0,4122 -0,1037 -3,0266*** -2,2335*** -3,3833*** -0,4367 -1,2956***-0,2846 -0,8404 -1,0648 -0,784 -1,1895 -0,2835 -0,372
0,0082*** 0,0047*** 0,0046** 0,0066*** 0,0072*** 0,0094*** 0,0079***-0,0006 -0,0015 -0,0019 -0,0016 -0,0016 -0,0007 -0,0007
0,0276*** 0,0168*** 0,0179*** 0,0256*** 0,0245*** 0,0326*** 0,0297***-0,0028 -0,0057 -0,0064 -0,0058 -0,0065 -0,0033 -0,0031





Constant -4,7739*** -4,6492*** -7,8504*** -5,1265*** -8,1405*** -4,9550*** -7,7293***
(0.1211) (0.3180) (0.3296) (0.2757) (0.2548) (0.1250) (0.1131)
N 36.820 4.613 4.709 5.307 5.909 36.820 40.800
R-squared 0,205 0,264 0,108 0,268 0,136 0,207 0,095
Number of stocks 37 36 36 37 37 37 37
       Restricted to Days               
VIX > p90
Restricted to Days              
∆VIX > p90
Interactions with dummy 
of High VIX
𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡






𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑆𝑆_ℎ𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ_𝑉𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑋
𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑆𝑆_ℎ𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ_𝑉𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑋
𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ×𝑆𝑆_ℎ𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ_𝑉𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑋





This table reports the results of the panel data models regressing the measures of volatility and 
liquidity at the stock-day level against the trading value by four types of investors: foreigners, local 
individuals, and local short-term and long-term institutions. Column (1) presents the results for the 
model of stock price volatility [2], Column (2) the mid-price volatility [3], Column (3) the effective 
spread [6], and Column (4) the average depth [7]. Wald tests that compare the trading activity 
coefficients of the different groups are reported. All models are estimated with the two-stage least 
squares method to account for the endogeneity between liquidity and volatility, fixed effects, and 
the Driscoll & Kraay (1998) covariance matrix estimator. The data come from the Colombia Stock 
Exchange (BVC) and Bloomberg from August 23, 1010 to August 31, 2012. N: Number of stock-






0,4102 0,0097 -0,0074** 3,1602***
0,0565*** -5,4608***
-0,0026***  2,2769***
0,0046*** 0 0 0,0068***
0,0228*** 0,0003*** -0,0001** 0,0233***
0,0103*** 0,0002** -0,0001*** 0,0079***
0,2830*** 0,0057*** -0,0001*** 0,3047***
-10,23*** -0,1097*** 0,0498*** 10,7142***
N 8.378 8.730 8.850 8.096
R-squared 0,274 0,065 0,109 0,466
Number of stocks 25 25 25 25
Wald Test
23,99*** 4,35** 4,43** 12,42***
9,67*** 2,04 3,55* 0,16
10,33*** 1,30 1,49 9,78***
618,94*** 146,37*** 64,25*** 134,75***
792,88** 175,49*** 85,17*** 177,20***




𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡_𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡






𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡_𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡_𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡_𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡_𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡_𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡_𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝_𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡_𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
